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Abstract: How do liberal democracies govern forensic DNA databasing? That is the question being 
asked in this contribution by focussing on the rules for inclusion of DNA databases in England & 
Wales and the Netherlands. The two different modes of governance shall be evaluated by taking into 
account models and ideas in each society regarding the two imperatives of ‘crime control’ and ‘due 
process’. Another question tentatively examined in this contribution is how these modes of 
governance impact the performance of national DNA databases. The analysis provided in this article 
argues that, when compared with the English and Welsh mode of governance, the Dutch mode of 
governance is more beneficial for the protection of individual rights and the effective use of 
resources.  
 
Keywords: DNA databases; forensics; governance; due process and crime control model 
 
 
Introduction  
The biological make-up of individuals and populations can be stored digitally in DNA databases. All 
kinds of technologies, scientific theories, standards and legal rules enable these repositories of 
biological life. This paper focuses on those DNA databases with forensic applications. A forensic DNA 
database is always situated at the intersection of science and law and should therefore be 
considered an object with different logics, histories and epistemologies (see Roberts forthcoming). 
Some of these differences will be addressed by providing an overview of the governance of forensic 
DNA databases in England & Wales (hereafter: England) and the Netherlands. 
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Forensic DNA databases typically have two registers. The first contains DNA profiles from known 
individuals – suspects and convicted offenders. Such individuals are often believed to commit more 
crimes and hence are uploaded to a ‘risk register’ (Rose 2007: 248). The second register contains 
DNA profiles obtained from biological traces collected from crime scenes or from dead bodies, and 
hence can be considered a register of unsolved crimes. Both registers can be speculatively searched 
against each other automatically and constantly, thereby matching DNA profiles from unsolved 
crimes to known individuals (Williams and Johnson 2008). A match with a DNA trace may render 
subjects as cold hit suspects ‘for whom – either at one stage of the investigation or throughout – 
there is no basis for suspicion other than a database hit (or match)’ (Cole and Lynch 2006: 47). This 
method of criminal investigation shapes police enquiries by ‘identifying potential suspects from the 
start rather than being used later to lend authoritative support to the incrimination or exoneration 
of otherwise nominated suspects’ (Williams 2010: 138).  
National forensic DNA databases were installed throughout many ‘Western’ jurisdictions in the 
second half of the 1990s and afterwards (Hindmarsh & Prainsack 2010) and are now considered ‘an 
integral and increasingly important tool of policing’ (Bramley 2009: 334) in many jurisdictions. 
Moreover, recent legislation of the European Union (EU) obliges all EU member states to install 
national DNA databases and make them available for comparison across jurisdictions (McCartney et 
al 2011; Prainsack & Toom 2010, forthcoming). It is within this context of internationalisation and 
the increasing importance of DNA databases that issues regarding ‘best practice’ arise, for instance 
related to the governance of forensic DNA databases, relevant rules for inclusion and measures of 
their performance.  
These issues are tentatively explored in the present contribution by comparing modes of governance 
of DNA databases in two jurisdictions: the National DNA Database of England & Wales (NDNAD) and 
the Dutch DNA database. After describing English and Dutch modes of governance, the succeeding 
section reviews the performance of the two national DNA databases and relates it to available 
literature on this topic. Results are summarised and some lessons drawn from the comparative 
exercise in the concluding section. 
 
England and the Netherlands: implementing or regulating technologies? 
Forensic DNA databasing in English and Dutch jurisdictions have been analysed by scholars from 
England, the Netherlands and the USA who have focussed on issues like civil rights, closure of 
controversies, reliability, and their lines of development (see Koops & Schellekens 2008; Krimsky & 
Simoncelli 2011; Lynch et al 2008; McCartney et al 2010; M’charek 2008; Toom 2010, 2011; Williams 
& Johnson 2008). Comprehensive analyses of the differences between the English and Dutch 
jurisdictions have been absent (with an exception of Prinsen 2008).  
The English and Dutch jurisdictions qualify for a comparative study on various counts. First, both 
jurisdictions have been using similar forensic DNA typing systems throughout the past two decades, 
and started installing forensic DNA databases in the mid 1990s. Second, both countries can be 
classified under the rubric of liberal democracies, which means that, among other things, the 
monopoly on violence is delegated to the state and its institutions. Forensic DNA profiling poses at 
least two politico-ethical problems: one, it is connected with infringements of individual rights (e.g. 
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bodily integrity, privacy); and, two, it is in tension with more general legal principles (e.g. 
proportionality of measures, presumption of innocence, burden of proof) (for these issues, see: 
ECtHR 2008; Krimsky & Simoncelli 2011; McCartney 2004; M’charek et al 2012; Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics 2007; US Congress 1990). Given these politico-ethical problems, measures that enable DNA 
profiling and databasing should be in accord with the rule of law. The rule of law is regarded a 
mechanism describing fundamental legal requirements for the governance of a country and 
simultaneously disciplines those in power; it is a philosophy, political theory and procedural device 
to maintain the sovereignty of law over man (Barnett 2009: 48). As a third similarity it can be 
observed that DNA typing in both jurisdictions had been implemented prudently on a case-by-case 
basis and gradually became established as a routine mechanism for the investigation and 
prosecution of a wide range of criminal activities, including the category of volume crimes like 
burglary and car theft (Toom 2010; Williams & Johnson 2008). Fourth, both countries have been 
regarded as being at the forefront of implementing and using forensic DNA typing.  
England is considered to be the most ambitious jurisdiction with regard to the use and 
implementation of forensic genetic techniques: DNA evidence was first used in the famous ‘Pitchfork 
case’ in 1986, and the NDNAD – installed in 1995 – was the world’s first forensic DNA database. 
Subsequently, in 2003, it was the first jurisdiction to apply ‘familial searching’ in the ‘M3-killer case’ 
(see Lynch et al 2008; Williams & Johnson 2008). If the English jurisdiction is renowned as taking the 
lead in applying forensic genetic techniques in criminal investigations and cases, then the Dutch 
jurisdiction has a track record for regulating the uses of genetic techniques for forensic purposes. 
More specifically, the 1994 Forensic DNA Typing Act was the world’s first legal provision for 
regulating DNA profiling in criminal cases, and the Netherlands have since 2003 been the only 
country with a law that allows for the use of genetically determined external visible characteristics in 
criminal investigations. Currently pending in Parliament is yet another Bill that aims to make familial 
searching possible.  
Despite these commonalities, there are large differences between the national forensic DNA 
databases held in these two jurisdictions (see figure 1). The figures show clearly that the NDNAD 
expanded considerably faster and further than the Dutch database (and any other country in Europe 
and the America’s) as a result of the very broad regimes for inclusion governing this jurisdiction. 
These differences in uploaded proportion of the population provide a focus to my inquiry in this 
contribution. My aim is to offer a tentative explanation for this disparity by focussing on relevant 
governance models and police powers in these two jurisdictions. The governance of the NDNAD will 
be considered first.  
 
Figure 1, source: ENFSI 2011.* Size of population and DNA databases as at May 2011. 
 Population size 
in million 
Total of persons in the 
DNA database  
Retained individuals of 
population 
England and Wales 53.7 5,368,950 10% 
Netherlands 16.1 118,936 0.74% 
* For up to date information regarding both DNA databases, see: www.npia.police.uk/en/13338.htm and 
http://www.forensischinstituut.nl/dna-databank/. 
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Governing through police powers: the English database 
To get a clearer understanding of English forensic DNA databasing, one has to take the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) into account. The antecedents of this piece of legislation date 
back to the 1970s, when public trust in the police was in decline after reported corruption and 
miscarriages of justice. PACE was drafted to re-install trust as it introduced ‘far-reaching procedural 
safeguards ... to guard against abuses of these powers’ (Newburn 2008: 93) through implementing 
mechanisms which took into account a ‘due process’ model. A due process model prioritises ‘civil 
liberties in order to secure the maximal acquittal of the innocent’ (Sanders & Young 2008: 282). 
PACE initially covered voluntarily DNA evidence since the use of force against suspects to obtain 
blood samples (which was a prerequisite for DNA technologies used in its first years of usage) could 
legally not be imposed. When biotechnologies for multiplying small amounts of DNA (polymerase 
chain reaction, PCR) became available in the mid 1990s, DNA extraction no longer was dependent on 
a subject’s blood sample but became possible from saliva. In 1994, an amendment to PACE 
redefined saliva as a non-intimate sample which enabled police officers to take a sample from the 
mouth without the consent of the subject; the same amendment rendered it legal to upload and 
speculatively search subject profiles against DNA traces. Other amendments followed suit in the 
second half of the 1990s and subsequent decade (for a full review, see Bramley 2009; Krimsky & 
Simoncelli 2011; Williams & Johnson 2008). These amendments included the indefinite retention of 
samples and DNA profiles and rendered new categories of persons liable for mandatory body 
searches. As such, the steady expansion resulted in the inclusion of 10 per cent of the English and 
Welsh population in the NDNAD in 2011 (ENFSI 2011). Yet, legal provisions for the balanced, 
responsible and proportionate governance of the NDNAD have been absent (see Williams 2010). As 
shall be described further below, this ‘extra-legal’ governance of the NDNAD will come to an end 
within the next year or so.  
Two recent events heralded the end of the steady expansion of the NDNAD and its extra-legal 
governance. The first event was the judgement of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in S. 
and Marper versus the United Kingdom in December 2008. Both S. and Marper were arrested in 
2001 and charged with, but not convicted of crimes. As both men were (legally) considered to be 
innocent, they requested the police to destroy their fingerprints and DNA samples. At the time of 
the request however, the law permitted the police to retain this material indefinitely and 
speculatively search DNA profiles (and fingerprints) obtained from those arrested for any recordable 
offence but never convicted, like S. and Marper. Consequently, the police refused to destroy 
fingerprints, DNA samples and DNA profiles originating from S. and Marper. The appellants sought 
judicial review of the police policy of retaining samples from all suspects who had been arrested, but 
were ultimately unsuccessful. The domestic appeals process having been exhausted, the matter 
came before the ECtHR where it was found that the domestic legislative scheme violated the 
applicants’ right to privacy under Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights:  
‘[T]he Court finds that the blanket and indiscriminate nature of the powers of retention of 
the fingerprints, cellular samples and DNA profiles of persons suspected but not convicted of 
offences, as applied in the case of the present applicants, fails to strike a fair balance 
between the competing public and private interests and that the respondent State has 
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overstepped any acceptable margin of appreciation in this regard. Accordingly, the retention 
at issue constitutes a disproportionate interference with the applicants’ right to respect for 
private life and cannot be regarded as necessary in a democratic society’ (ECtHR 2008).  
Although PACE started as an attempt to reinstate trust in the English police, the governance of DNA 
profiling and databasing through police powers – combined with the ‘forensic imaginary’ of DNA 
evidence (Williams 2010) and its ‘founding myths’ (Prainsack & Toom forthcoming) – allowed for 
steady and piecemeal expansions to those police powers, thereby rendering a substantial part of the 
English and Welsh population ‘suspicious’. In this way, English forensic DNA practices can be seen as 
being especially influenced by the utilitarian ‘crime control’ model as applied to criminal justice. 
Such model has been associated with securing the ‘conviction of the guilty, risking the conviction of 
some (fewer) innocents and infringement of the liberties of some citizens’ (Sanders & Young 2008: 
282).  
While the Government of the United Kingdom is obliged to implement rulings of the ECtHR, room for 
interpreting the ruling and subsequent room for adjusting policy is considerable.
1
 It has been widely 
acknowledged that the Labour Party, who had been in government since 1997, was and is a 
proponent of wide inclusion rules. Many amendments facilitating forensic DNA databasing were 
drafted by the Labour Government and accepted by the Labour majority in Parliament. In response 
to the ECtHR judgement, the Labour Government announced in a policy document with the telling 
title ‘Keeping the Right People on the DNA Database’ that fingerprints and DNA profiles of persons 
suspected and arrested but not convicted would be retained for 6 to a maximum of 12 years to 
achieve ‘compliance with the judgement while maximising public protection’ (Home Office 2009: 5). 
This policy intention was met by harsh critiques by organisations like StateWatch, GeneWatch UK, 
Justice, and the Human Genetics Commission. Labour’s political rival, the Conservative Party, also 
criticized Labour’s proposal regarding compliance with the judgement and declared it unacceptable 
to retain ‘DNA on the database of people who have never been convicted of a crime ... in a society 
founded on the basis that someone is innocent until proven guilty’ and proposed using ‘DNA in a 
proportionate manner to detect crimes and prosecute offenders’ (Conservative Party 2009: 9). 
Despite the aired criticism, the then Government submitted the ‘Crime and Security Bill’ to 
Parliament. This Bill has not been brought into force as the Conservative Party won the May 2010 
elections. These elections should therefore be considered the second recent event that ended two 
decades of steady expansion of forensic DNA profiling and databasing in England. 
Early in 2011, the Conservative’s and Liberal Democrats Government presented the ‘Protection of 
Freedoms Bill’ (House of Commons 2011). The Bill provides for the destruction, retention and use of 
evidential material, including biological samples and fingerprints. Hence, after more than 15 years of 
extra-legal DNA databasing in England, a piece of legislation setting legal rules for governing the 
NDNAD is now pending. In line with the ECtHR judgement, the Bill proposes that ‘fingerprints and 
DNA profiles taken from persons arrested for or charged with a minor offence will be destroyed 
following either a decision not to charge or following acquittal. In the case of persons charged for, 
but not convicted of, a serious offence, fingerprints and DNA profiles may be retained for three 
                                                          
1
 For an excellent account of the UK’s response to S. and Marper v the United Kingdom, see Carole 
McCartney’s: Of Weighty Reasons and Indiscriminate Blankets: The Retention of DNA for Forensic Purposes. 
The Howard Journal of Criminal Justice. 51(3): p. 245-260, can be downloaded from 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2311.2012.00717.x/abstract.  
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years, with a single two-year extension available on application by a Chief Officer of Police to a 
District Judge (Magistrates’ Courts)’ (House of Commons 2011: 1), thereby adopting rules as applied 
in the so-called ‘Scottish model’ (see McCartney et al 2010). Implementing the Scottish model in 
England &Wales would mean that the governance of forensic DNA databasing in these jurisdictions 
would reinstall aspects of the aforementioned ‘due process’ model. After having reviewed the 
English mode of governance, the next section considers the Dutch mode.  
 
Legal rights as organisational principle: the Dutch database 
The trajectory of Dutch forensic genetics is comparable to that in the English jurisdiction yet the 
resulting practices differ considerably. Forensic DNA typing is, as already mentioned, intimately 
connected with infringements of individual civil rights (e.g. bodily integrity, privacy) and general legal 
principles (e.g. presumption of innocence, proportionality, onus of proof). Many of these legal 
principles are acknowledged in the European Convention on Human Rights and the Dutch 
Constitution. Individual rights can be violated if they are in accordance with the law, are considered 
necessary in a democratic society, and if a democratic Parliament voted in favour for such law. In the 
process of drafting and passing laws for forensic DNA profiling, infringements of individual rights and 
more general legal principles were weighted in Dutch Parliament against the gains of using forensic 
genetic technologies (Toom 2011). As such, these rights and principles are at the heart of Dutch 
forensic DNA databasing – they are an organisational principle contributing to the aforementioned 
due process model. Legislation is hence, by and large and in contrast with England, considered a 
(legal) prerequisite for Dutch forensic DNA databasing and its practices.  
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, DNA evidence could only be obtained with consent of a suspect. 
The 1994 Forensic DNA Profiling Act rendered suspects of severe crimes (e.g. homicide, sex crimes) 
liable for mandatory body searches. The same Law also set legal provisions for uploading and 
speculatively searching DNA profiles in a DNA database, determined the period for retention of DNA 
profiles, and set rules for the deletion of DNA profiles and destroying reference samples (for a full 
review, see Koops & Schellekens 2008; M’charek 2008; M’charek et al 2012; Toom 2010). 
Subsequent amendments rendered new categories of suspects and convicted offenders suitable for 
(mandatory) DNA typing. In addition, procedural powers to order bodily searches were distributed 
from the judiciary to the Office of Public Prosecution thereby transforming the application of DNA 
profiling from courtroom evidence to investigative information. Accordingly, new genetic 
technologies useful for criminal investigation (phenotyping, familial searching) became authorised 
(or are pending legislation) for use in police enquiries.  
Contrary to England and Wales, where forensic genetics in general and DNA databasing in particular 
has been debated intensively, public discussions with regard to Dutch forensic DNA databasing and 
its practices have been largely lacking. Independent and authoritative organisations similar to 
GeneWatch UK, Nuffield Bioethics and the Human Genetics Commission are by and large absent in 
the Netherlands. The influence of organisations involved in policy development (e.g. The Rathenau 
Institute, Centre for Society and Genomics) and governance (e.g. Dutch Data Protection Authority) is 
generally minor, and research institutes affiliated with the Ministry of Justice and Security (i.e. 
Research and Documentation Centre) published comprehensive yet uncritical reviews. 
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This is not to imply that the governance of Dutch forensic DNA practices is without any deficiencies 
or problems. For instance, the Dutch police currently ‘collect’ individuals convicted for petty crimes 
from their residential addresses with the aim of obtaining a bodily sample for DNA profiling. 
Although collecting these convicted offenders is in accord with Dutch legislation, it remains to be 
seen if such corresponds to Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights, as these police 
actions arguably contribute to the national security, public safety, the prevention of disorder and 
crime, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. In other words, collecting petty 
offenders to obtain cellular material for DNA analysis may be a disproportionate measure (Toom 
2012). In addition to this issue, the use of forensic DNA technologies to generate leads for policing 
purposes (e.g. determining external visible characteristics, familial searching) have been associated 
with undermining legal principles like the presumption of innocence and the onus of proof 
(M’charek et al 2012; Toom 2012). After having reviewed the governance of DNA databases, the 
next section will address issues related to the structure and performance of DNA databases. 
 
Towards appropriate and efficient DNA database structures 
As already mentioned, the NDNAD contains 10% of the English and Welsh population whereas a 
more moderate 0.74% of the Dutch population is included to the national DNA database of the 
Netherlands. A second difference regards the proportion of traces: the Dutch database contains 
relatively four times more traces than the NDNAD. As such, NDNAD and the Dutch DNA database 
have different ‘structures’. At issue in this section is what structure is better. However, answering 
this question is problematic as almost no statistical evidence and rigorous comparative analysis 
providing information on the utility of forensic DNA databases is available (Human Genetics 
Commission 2009: 7, 64; McCartney et al 2010: 13). One exception to this rule is an American 
quantitative and comparative study of the performance of the American DNA database and the 
NDNAD. This research found that ‘focusing on uploading proven offenders and crime-scene profiles 
has a greater impact on database matches (“investigations aided”) than uploading suspected 
offenders at the point of arrest’ (Goulka et al 2010: 18; see also Roman et al 2008).  
A very rudimental measurement on the performance of DNA databases that takes into account the 
number of subject profiles and the number of DNA traces is the so-called ‘stain-person matches per 
person’ (‘total of stain-person matches’ divided by ‘total of persons’). This measurement is reported 
by the European Network of Forensic Science Institutes (ENFSI) (see figure 2). Despite their different 
structures, and using the ‘stain-person matches per person’, the NDNAD and Dutch databases are 
more or less equally effective. In other words, the measurement applied here does not favour either 
structure nor does it favour a larger or smaller DNA database. That does not mean that both DNA 
database structures perform equally well from a human rights perspective. The Dutch database 
achieves a similar performance with far less stringent rules for inclusion. In other words, the 
structure of the Dutch database is equally efficient yet associated with less infringed individual 
rights. As there is a lack of statistical analyses on this issue, future studies may provide more 
evidence for determining ‘best structures’ for forensic DNA databases. 
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Figure 2, source: ENFSI 2011. Performance of DNA databases as at May 2011. 
 Total of DNA 
profiles in 
database 
Total of 
persons in 
the DNA 
database 
Total of 
traces 
Total of 
stain-person 
matches 
Stain-person 
matches per 
person 
Proportion 
of traces of 
total 
amount 
England and 
Wales 
5,756,513 5,368,950 387,563 1,422,573 0.26 6.73% 
Netherlands 166,049 118,936 47,113 27,130 0.23 28.37% 
 
 
Conclusions 
The governance of the national DNA databases of England and the Netherlands have been centre-
staged in this paper. What lessons can be gained from the comparative analysis? First, the NDNAD 
still lacks any legislative mechanism for the governance of this register of suspicious subjects and 
unsolved crimes. The Protection of Freedoms Bill, currently pending in Parliament, should, after 
more than 15 years, bring an end to this situation. The Netherlands however first passed specific 
forensic DNA legislation and only then installed a DNA database. Legal provisions are in place for 
retaining, erasing and destroying DNA profiles and reference samples, and as such, rights of innocent 
individuals, suspects and convicted offenders are accounted for.  
Second, DNA profiles and reference samples of one-time suspected individuals who are not charged 
and have no criminal record will, if the Protection of Freedoms Bill passes, be retained for a three 
year period without any judicial evaluation. This also is in contrast with the Dutch system: public 
prosecutors have procedural powers to order DNA typing from suspects who face imprisonment for 
four years or more, and these DNA profiles will be speculatively searched against all available DNA 
traces, but if no match is established, and the suspect is not convicted for the crime, the DNA profile 
has to be removed from the database. If any individual is convicted for a crime with a liability of four 
years or more imprisonment, his or her DNA profile will be stored in the database, depending on the 
severity of the crime, for either 20 or 30 years. Hence, long-term stored DNA profiles in the Dutch 
database are always a consequence of a passed judgement.  
Intimately connected with the two former differences is, thirdly, the ‘object’ of governance. In the 
English jurisdiction, procedural powers were distributed through the PACE, and as such governing 
through police powers has been one of the enabling mechanisms for the expansion of the NDNAD. 
This mode of governing centre-stages issues like public safety and crime control at the expense of 
individual safety and due process. Yet, in the Dutch jurisdiction, civil rights have always structured 
the governance of forensic DNA databasing and its practices. Consequently, rights of suspects and 
convicted offenders in the Dutch jurisdiction have been centre staged. That does not mean that the 
Dutch system is without problems and flaws – what it does mean is that citizens in the Netherlands 
are better protected against a mechanism sometimes called ‘selective enforcement’ (Fuller 1964: 
78), where measures serve the convenience of police and prosecutor yet come along with 
arbitrariness, racial biases or disproportionate measures.  
Fourth, (scarcely) available statistical data suggests that a relatively large collection of traces 
combined with uploading profiles of convicted offenders has a positive impact on the production of 
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investigative leads. The Dutch database is populated with DNA profiles obtained from convicted 
offenders and (in the law circumscribed groups of) suspects and contains a relatively large collection 
of crime related traces – yet despite having a much smaller percentage of the population included, it 
performs as well as the NDNAD in producing matches between traces and subjects (the stain-person 
matches per person parameter). Based on this parameter, it can be concluded that the Dutch mode 
of organising forensic DNA databasing, its structure of the DNA database and its practices is 
accompanied by fewer infringements of individual rights (bodily integrity, privacy) and legal 
principles (presumption of innocence, proportionality, onus of proof). At the same time it is equally 
effective, efficient and hence more cost effective. 
If one cherishes civil rights, then the Dutch model of legislating forensic DNA databasing and its 
practices first, and only subsequently implementing those technologies is superior to that of the 
English model of using forensic genetics without formulating dedicated legislative provisions 
regarding the NDNAD. Simultaneously, and based on the rudimentary statistical data currently 
available, the Dutch model contributes to processes of criminal investigation more effective, more 
efficiently and cost effectively than does the English model.  
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